

# Centre for Health Economics Seminar Series

7 May 2008

## Reinterpreting Economic Evaluation in the Context of an NHS: The Case for a Fairness Focused Framework

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# Economics

- Aim
  - Maximise wellbeing as defined by social values and preferences
- Theory (one role)
  - Logically connect policy – claimed goals

# Criterion CEA/CUA

Minimise Cost/(Unit of Benefit)


# Theme 1

Cost / (unit of benefit)

Theoretical and  
Empirical Errors

A white arrow points from the bottom box to the top box.

# Theme 2



# Contents

1. The orthodox framework
2. Why orthodoxy fails
3. Fairness in an NHS
4. Epistemology
5. Empirical Ethics
6. Would people minimise costs/life year
7. Conclusions

# Argument

Section 1 There must be a causal link between recommended policy and claimed objectives: satisfying population objectives

Economic evaluation is justified by orthodox welfare theory and its assumptions. These are highly problematical

Section 2 All programs redistribute benefits. To overcome the problem this creates, orthodox theory appeals to the concepts of Pareto Efficiency and Potential Compensation. Both concepts are flawed in an NHS

Section 3 Existence of an NHS in every country demonstrates a universality of fairness objectives. However the implications of this are forgotten

# Argument cont'd

- Section 4 How do we justify our policies? Orthodox assumptions are wrong. *A priori* ethics fails. Empirical Ethics is fallible
- Section 5 Some empirical results are illustrated.
- Section 6 Empirical results indicate that people wish to share benefits NOT (just) minimise costs
- Section 7 The role of the economist should be to inform not dictate and (mislead) the social debate
- Section 8 New results

# 1. The Orthodox Framework

## Gold standard decision rule

Maximise Net present value (NPV)

$NPV = \text{Benefits (direct, Indirect)} - \text{Costs (Direct, Indirect)}$

# 1. The Orthodox Framework

## Gold standard decision rule

Max. Net present value (NPV)

NPV = Benefits (direct, Indirect) - Costs (Direct, Indirect)

Invest if

NPV  $\geq 1$

Benefits (B) . Costs (C)  $\geq 1$

Benefits  $\geq$  Costs

B/C  $\geq 1$

# Problem: Monetising Value Life

## Cost Effective Analysis (CEA)

Rule : Min Cost / LY

Cost Utility Analysis  
Min Cost / QALY

# Rationale for Orthodoxy Methods is Welfare Theory

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Pareto Efficiency  $\rightarrow$  social welfare  $\uparrow$
    - Fairness  $\leftarrow$  distribution of initial wealth utility  
Fairness separated from analysis of efficiency

## 2. Why Orthodoxy Fails

### Two additional problems with health care

#### 1. Information (an aside)

- Insufficient information – no coherent preferences
- Abdication of consumer sovereignty

# Two key problems (cont'd)

## 2. Fairness

Orthodoxy: Uncritically efficiency focused

All programs redistribute

Orthodox practice ... Ignores

theory ... 'Pareto efficiency


... Potential compensation

# Is Pareto Self Evident?


# Is Pareto Self Evident?

- Comparisons are not necessary if some better, none worse off

# Is Pareto Self Evident



# Is Pareto Self Evident



## Motives

- Envy
- Jesus (St Matthew)
- Egalitarianism
- Liberalism (x is coercive)
- Duty (z imposes a burden)  
eg no coal exports  
sacrifice for children

# Evidence

[n = 455]

- Society is better off if wealthy receive a higher income and the poor are no worse off

agree 23.3%

disagree 62.8%

# Potential Compensation Principle (Kaldor Hicks)

'Situation, X, is better if there is the potential to compensate loser' ie potential for Pareto Efficiency

Example: X is better: You will die. But that's OK because we could have prevented this (but didn't!)

# Kaldor Hicks - Wrong

Could have been better = are better !  
(logic = St Augustine)

*BUT*

- (i) Potential  $\neq$  actual
- (ii) Serious health problems
  - Effective compensation likely
- (iii) Death: no compensation
- (iv) Compensation loser = taxpayer  
ie tax sick/poor; reimburse taxpayer

# Conclusion

- Causal link: assumptions – conclusion broken
- Each policy: re-distributes net benefits  
issue of fairness

# 3. Fairness in an NHS

## Minimal Conclusion

- NHS every wealthy country (inc USA – Medicare, Medicaid) implies compulsion, paternalism overturning complete sovereignty of consumer
- **Hypothesis:** This reflects population values (not a bribe: like 'a free beer scheme'  
– Snr Australian Economist)

# Consequences of Fairness

## Hypothesis of support

Q: *'The entire population should receive some assistance for health care even when the majority of taxpayers are opposed to this'* (n = 455)

agree	80.6
disagree	5.6

## Support for (health related) compensation (n = 455 )

**Q:** (in health context) It is OK to restrict  
people's behaviour against their will

agree 53.8

disagree 25.6

# Challenge to the Efficiency Focus

Case for a fairness focused framework

(*JHE* 2006)

Four theoretical issues where fairness  
overturns conventional wisdom/analysis

- Treatment indirect benefits

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Case for a fairness focused framework

(*JHE* 2006)

Four theoretical issues where fairness  
overturns conventional wisdom/analysis

- Treatment indirect benefits
- Moral hazard
- Future un-related medical costs
- Fundamental Rule:  $M \text{ Cost} = M \text{ Benefit}$

# Should $MC = M$ Benefit

- Orthodoxy (preferences revealed by \$)
  - Benefit Rich = WTP > Benefit Poor = WTP
- Real Rule
  - M Cost = M 'Generosity'
    - ← values *wrt* fairness
  - Generosity = possible fn of
    - QoL, LY, Severity, Age, R of R
    - = Soc WTP

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Purpose of an NHS is to override rule

## 4. Epistemology: How do we answer ethical questions?

1. Platonic Orthodoxy (PO)
  - Assume Welfarism etc
  - (near cousin) Assume Healthism
2. *A priori* Ethical Analysis
  - As defined by discipline of Ethics
3. Empirical Ethics

# Option 2 Ethics per se

Improbability of resolution

if theory A  $\equiv$  theory B wrt implications

A, B are the same theory

if theory A  $\neq$  theory wrt all implication

each theory conflicts with another

well reasoned theory

***Consequence:*** rhetorical squabbling

# Option 2: Ethics Per Se

## Logical Impossibility of Resolution

'Superiority' (view A) implies evaluative criteria (A)

'Acceptability' criterion (A) implies a standard ie criterion B  
B requires C requires D...

**Proposition:** Role of ethics is to critique – seek inconsistency – challenge ... NOT to establish truth

**Evidence:** Cumulative history of ethics... We cannot keep waiting

# Option 3: Empirical Ethics (EE)

**NB: EE = proposed formalisation of existing practice**

- 1 Iterative elicitation of values  
Hypothesis generation, clarification
- 2 Quantification of social (value) preferences)  
Deliberation
- 3 Ethics critique, ie testing
- 4 Resubmit for reconsideration, reformulation
- 5 Tentative acceptance

# 5. Empirical Ethics: Some Results

(n = 455)

Population view of fairness:

- Which ethical principles?
- Is welfarism supported?
- What dominates ethical thinking?

## Population view of fairness: which ethical principles

### 1. Australians are not hedonic utilitarians

**Q:** 'Action producing happiness is always right'

agree 22.8%

disagree 57.4%

**Q:** 'Maximising happiness is more important'  
than any other principle

agree 14.3%

disagree 65.9%

## 2. Australians (Norwegians) not preference utilitarians in context of health sector

Survey	Australians	334
	Norwegians	227

Option 1: Maximise lives saved:      Screening Program

Option 2: Variable reason:      Helicopter Rescue

# Australia, Norway Results

Reason for alternative program	% Maximising lives (rejecting alternative program)	
	Australia	Norway
Public preference (welfarism)	68.7*	72.24*
Rule of Rescue	53.8	49.0
Equity	62.7	48.9
n	334	227

•Test of (social) preference utilitarianism

Conclude 'Healthism'  $\geq$  R of R, Equity  
 $>$  Welfarism

# Which Principle (cont'd)

3. There is strong commitment to 'duty', 'role in community', solidarity/communitarianism)

NB: ignored in economic theory

Q1 'Must fulfil duties even if it makes me less happy'

agree	91.5
disagree	3.9

There is strong commitment to 'duty', role in community (solidarity/communitarianism)

Q2 'Having duties is a natural part of being a member of society'

agree	95.0
disagree	00.0

There is strong commitment to 'duty', role in community (solidarity/communitarianism)

Q3 'Duties connects people ... They make a community'

agree	92.2
disagree	0.8

There is strong commitment to 'duty', role in community (solidarity/communitarianism)

Q4 'I fulfil my duties because it is my job'

agree	77.8
disagree	16.7

# Which Principle (cont'd)

Rejoinder: 'But people fulfil duty because they selfishly benefit'

Q5 'People help others only because they gain something personally'

agree	18.2
disagree	60.7

# Conclusion wrt Principles

- Support for an NHS due to belief in
  - Fairness/duty/community
- Object of scheme
  - Health, not utility
- Rules for allocation
  - Should reflect this

# Evidence from the Empirical Ethics Literature

Topic	Argument/evidence
Economic cost	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>'Discrimination' against those with high cost illness rejected. Empirical results Australia, Norway, Spain, USA</li> </ul>
Transfer payments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Relevant to how much informed taxpayers will pay (Richardson &amp; McKie 2007)</li> </ul>
Age	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Importance of benefit varies by age UK, Australia, USA, Spain, Norway</li> </ul>
Severity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Importance of given health gain varies with severity of start point (Australia, Spain, USA, Norway)</li> </ul>
Potential	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Importance of health gain varies with capacity to gain (Oregon)</li> </ul>
Rule of Rescue	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Context matters (McKie &amp; Richardson 2003)</li> </ul>
Cause/Context of disease	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Discriminate against smokers disagree 38.8; agree 44.6</li> </ul>

# 6. Problem with Cost

Would people minimise Cost/QALY ?

Richardson and Nord

## Would people minimise Cost/QALY

- Among patients who are equally ill, those who can be helped at LOW COST should have priority over those who can be helped at high cost, because this will allow more people to be helped when the money is limited [*Agree 19%*]
- It is UNFAIR TO DISCRIMINATE against those who happen to have a high cost illness. Priority should therefore not depend on the cost of treatment (except in cases where costs are extremely high) [*Agree 81%*]

# Cost (cont'd)

<b>STAGE 2</b>	(Interview) Repeat emphasising budget n = 119 constraint: words used, have some priority prefer low cost	...	30%
<b>STAGE 3</b>	Challenge but more health possible change	...	No
<b>STAGE 4</b>	Numerical example Low cost vs first come, first served → low cost		
<b>STAGE 5</b>	Allocate a budget between low cost – high cost consequences shown Health Maximising Choice	...	6%

# Problem with cost

- **Nord & Richardson (1995)**

Who cares about cost: Does economic analysis reflect or ignore social values?’

- **Abellan-Perpinan & Pinto (1999)**

Allocate a budget

	<b>A</b>	<b>B</b>	
Cost	100	200	⇒ Maximise Health
Benefit	x	x	

- **Ubel (2000)**

Allocate organs ⇒ Maximise Health

\* % good prognosis

\* % poor prognosis

# Cost/LY vs fairness between individuals a general test

# Web based allocation exercise

The diagram below represents 4 patients and the age when they will die which is shown in red

Click on the box where you think Medicare should spend \$10,000

**Patient 1** 73  
12 yrs 12 yrs 12 yrs 12 yrs

**Patient 2** 73  
8 yrs 8 yrs 8 yrs 8 yrs 8 yrs 8 yrs


**Patient 3** 73  
6 yrs 6 yrs 6 yrs 6 yrs 6 yrs 6 yrs 6 yrs 6 yrs

**Patient 4** 73  
4 yrs 4 yrs 4 yrs 4 yrs 4 yrs 4 yrs 4 yrs 4 yrs 4 yrs 4 yrs 4 yrs 4 yrs


[\[Exit and Clear Survey\]](#)




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
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
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
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# Extreme Egalitarianism



# Indices: Spearman correlation and ad hoc index

		Spearman correlation		$\Sigma (O_1 - O_2)^2 / \text{max ind}$	
		Response Order vs Order			
	n	Efficiency	Egalitarian	Efficiency	Egalitarian
Graduate	7	0.6520	0.4448	0.090	0.1330
Total	27	0.68	0.41	0.0819	0.1409

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Economist	9	0.6923	0.3634	0.080	0.1526
Graduate	7	0.6520	0.4448	0.090	0.1330
Other	12	0.6983	0.4298	0.078	0.1366
Total	27	0.68	0.41	0.0819	0.1409

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<b>Patient 1</b>	12 yrs	12 yrs	12 yrs	12 yrs	73							
<b>Patient 2</b>	8 yrs	8 yrs	8 yrs	8 yrs	8 yrs	8 yrs	73					
<b>Patient 3</b>	6 yrs	6 yrs	6 yrs	6 yrs	6 yrs	6 yrs	6 yrs	73				
<b>Patient 4</b>	4 yrs	4 yrs	4 yrs	4 yrs	4 yrs	4 yrs	4 yrs	4 yrs	4 yrs	4 yrs	4 yrs	73

[\[Exit and Clear Survey\]](#)

		Spearman correlation		$\Sigma (O_1 - O_2)^2 / \text{max ind}$	
		Response Order vs Order			
	n	Equal services	Compromise Eclectic	Equal service	Compromise Eclectic
Economist	9	0.6090	0.5109	0.1044	0.1281
Graduate	7	0.5438	0.5089	0.1219	0.1294
Other	12	0.5573	0.5334	0.1180	0.1229
Total	27	0.5706	0.5200	0.1146	0.1262

# Deriving a cost algorithm to replace cost

- Cost/LY = [gained LY/1,000]<sup>-1</sup>  
= [size of 'Block']<sup>-1</sup>
- 'Budget' = [\$10,000] [number of iterations]
- LY/person = services [clicks]\*[LY/service]
- "Severity" = Life expectancy

# Deriving the threshold

$$\ln \rho / (1-p) = a - b_1 P - b_2 LE + b_3 Y$$

$$\text{if } \rho = \frac{1}{2}$$

$$0 = a - b_1 P - b_2 LE + b_3 Y$$

If Y, LE fixed

$$\begin{aligned} \text{cost}/LY = P &= (1/b_1)(a + b_2 LE + b_3 Y) \\ &= \text{fixed threshold/person} \end{aligned}$$

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But

$$LE = f[Q] = f[\text{cost}/LY] \text{ ie endogenous}$$

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But

$$LE = f[Q] = f[\text{cost/LY}] \text{ ie endogenous}$$

$$[\text{Cost/LY}]/\text{person} = 1/b_1 [a - b_2(f(\text{cost/LY})) + b_3 Y] \dots \text{Equation 1}$$

# Logit results n = 1560 (36 people)

## Probability Service Received

	b	z	p
Cost/LY	-76	-6.7	0.00
Life Expectancy	0.15	0.7	0.47
Income	1.7	11.2	0.00
Const			
n=168			

Interpretation: a small change in price requires a large offsetting change in Y: consistent with fixed threshold

# Logit results n = 1560 (36 people)

## Probability Service Received

	b	z	p	b	z	p
Cost/LY	-76	-6.7	0.0	-1.76	-1.25	0.21
Life Expectancy	0.15	0.7	0.47 ns	-0.116	-9.19	0.00
Income	1.7	11.2	0.0	0.19	8.67	0.00
Const				-0.91	-3.6	0.00
	n=168			LR chi 2 (3) = 181		

Interpretation: a large increase in cost/LY offset by a small change in LE

# Regression results n = 1,386

Dependent = Life Expectancy

	Linear		Log	
	b	t	b	t
Cost/LY	-99.4	-40.0	-0.73	35.6
Income	1.60	89.8	0.91	67.5
Constant	16.4	32.7	-0.68	-11.7
R <sup>2</sup>	0.86		0.79	

# Calibrating the threshold

Equation 1

$$a = -0.91; b_1 = -1.76(\text{ns}); b_2 = -0.116; b_3 = 0.19$$

$$\text{LE (linear)} = 16.4 + 1.6 \text{ income} - 99.4 (\text{cost/LY})$$

$$\text{Cost/LY} = -1.59 + 6.55 \text{ cost/LY} + 0.29 \text{ Inc}$$

# Logit, enlarged database

N = 46,608 (36 people)

PR	Coefficient	Z	P
P	9.66	55.7	0.000
Life Expectancy	0.008	9.13	0.000
Y	0.02	12.5	0.000
Constant	-2.7	-63.1	0.000

LR chi 2 (3) = 4031

# Beginning of Conclusions

- Each different price = different person
- No threshold: trade-off
  - price  $\uparrow$   $\rightarrow$  (a) disembodied efficiency  $\downarrow$   
: pressure to not fund
  - (b) fairness  $\uparrow$   
pressure to compromise

# Efficiency vs Fairness

- Efficiency focus
  - Disembodied costs, benefits
  - Distribution an aside/neglected
  - Description of economics
- Fairness focus
  - Relationships between people
  - Efficiency an aside/neglected
  - Description of population

# Efficiency vs Fairness

- Efficiency focus
  - Disembodied costs, benefits
  
- Fairness focus
  - Relationships between people

# AND

Change cost



re distribution

# AND

Change cost



re distribution

Hence:

Efficiency (cost/benefit) and fairness (sharing)  
Are inextricable and must be judged simultaneously

# AND

Change cost



re distribution

Hence:

Efficiency (cost/benefit) and fairness (sharing)  
Are inextricable and must be judged simultaneously

Hence:

Impact [cost ↑, fairness ↓] ≠ [Impact cost ↑ alone]

# (Getting closer to the end) Common problem

- Objectives assumed, not observed
- Assumed benefits utility
- Assumed costs loss utility
- Observed costs reflects fairness
- Observed benefits reflects fairness

(Even closer)  
Most destructive assumptions

Cannot compare individuals

Ethics is outside scope of economics

(Even closer)  
Most destructive assumptions

Cannot compare individuals

Ethics is outside scope of economics

*BUT*

Comparison of people

= key to wellbeing

= basis of political economy

= most common human activity

# What is the ideal method?

## Impossibility of an Ideal Metric for Decisions and how we should select one

(Richardson 2007)

- Different metrics  $\rightarrow$  different distributions
- Economic orthodoxy  $\Rightarrow$  solution
- Ethics  $\Rightarrow$  answer
- Empirical ethics  $\Rightarrow$  guarantees
- Voting  $\Rightarrow$  ideal solution (Arrow)
- Arrow (trivial)  $\Rightarrow$  solution

# Final Conclusion! (Promise)

1. Provide
  - Information on objectives
  - Options/objectives
2. Empirical Ethics: likely to be
  - Fairness focussed
3. Stop imposing values on society
  - Present pretentions = Hubris
4. Accept status of 'Dentist' (Keynes)  
not Philosopher King (Plato)

# Postscript (non core promise)

- Eliminate the term 'efficiency'
  - Maximising wrong objectives  $\neq$  efficiency  
max QALY/cost  $\neq$  efficiency if we wish to share
  - 'Efficiency' is a coercive term
- Eliminate the term 'equity'
  - Excludes too many objectives eg solidarity/  
community; unequal treatment of unequals
  - Equity (also) a coercive term

# Neutral terminology

- Maximise objectives
  - Subject to constraints
  - Identify trade-offs
- Research tasks
  1. Assist (not dictate) finding objectives
  2. Technical analysis to maximise goals

**FIN**