

**Department of Economics**

**Issn 1441-5429**

**Discussion paper 02/09**

**AGGLOMERATION ECONOMIES AND THE LOCATION OF TAIWANESE  
INVESTMENT IN CHINA**

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**Abstract:**

We investigate the effect of agglomeration economies on Taiwanese greenfield investors' location choice in China from 1996 to 2005. Using a nested logit model, we find that Taiwanese investors first select a region in China where he or she wants to invest, before selecting the best province within that region. Furthermore, we find evidence that, since 2000, market access, industrial linkages and monitoring costs have become important agglomeration forces driving Taiwanese investors' location choice in China. Finally, we discover that the nature of agglomeration economies varies extensively for Taiwanese investors across different industries. Taken together, these findings suggest that the Chinese government must formulate region-wide development strategies and industry-specific policies if it wants to attract more Taiwanese investment in the near future.

**Keywords:** Agglomeration economies; China; Nested logit model; Taiwanese investment

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I would like to thank Russell Smyth, Dietrich Fausten and Robert Rice for their helpful comments and suggestions.

# 1 Introduction

New economic geography (NEG), pioneered by Krugman (1991a,b) in the 1990s, has reshaped our understanding of the spatial distribution of economic activity. Unlike the neoclassical approach to economic geography, which emphasises the role of comparative advantage, the NEG literature identifies agglomeration economies as one of the driving forces for the concentration of certain industries in particular locations (see e.g. Fujita et al., 1999; Baldwin et al., 2003). Later, researchers extended that idea to the regional distribution of foreign direct investment (FDI). A majority of empirical studies in this field focus on the United States. In general, these studies find a positive relationship between agglomeration economies and the distribution of FDI at the state level (see e.g. Coughlin et al., 1991; Coughlin and Segev, 2000; Shaver and Flyer, 2000; Chung and Alcacer, 2002). Furthermore, Head et al. (1999) and Bobonis and Shatz (2003) find that agglomeration economies affect foreign investors' location choice in the United States more than fiscal incentives and preferential treatment. They attribute this finding to the fact that, unlike fiscal incentives and preferential treatment, which can be elusive in the long run, agglomeration economies can lead to a prolonged improvement in productivity.

There is also strong evidence suggesting that agglomeration economies have a positive effect on the distribution of FDI within the European Union (see e.g. Meyer, 1998; Resmini, 2000; Kinoshita and Campos, 2002; Agiomirgiannakis et al., 2003; Head et al., 2004). At the country level, Driffield (2000, 2002), Driffield and Munday (2001) and Girma (2002) find that foreign investors in the United Kingdom prefer locations with strong agglomeration economies. In Portugal, Guimaraes et al. (2000) discover that agglomeration economies help to reduce transaction costs for greenfield investors. Along a similar line of reasoning, Deichmann et al. (2003) suggest that agglomeration economies facilitate flows of information among foreign investors in Turkey. Bronzini (2004) argue that agglomeration economies inside industrial clusters is a key attractor for FDI in Italy. Boudier-Bensebaa (2005) and Hilber and Voicu (2005) find that this agglomeration economies effect also figures prominently in the distribution of FDI in Hungary and Romania, respectively. Barrios et al. (2006) attribute the rise of Ireland's high-technology industry to agglomeration economies among foreign investors.

In another strand of studies, researchers focus on the impact of 'nationality agglomeration', or agglomeration economies arising from the co-location of foreign investors of the same

nationality, on foreign investors' location choice. For Japanese investors in the United States, researchers find that this nationality agglomeration has a non-negligible effect on these investors' location choice at the county and state levels (see e.g. Woodward, 1992; Smith and Florida, 1994; Head et al., 1995; Chung and Song, 2004; Head et al., 2004). This nationality agglomeration is also found to be prevalent among American, Swedish, and French multinationals when they venture abroad (see e.g. Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Braunerhjelm and Svensson, 1996; Disdier and Mayer, 2004; Mucchielli and Puech, 2004).

The rise to prominence of China as a destination for FDI has led to an ample empirical literature investigating the effect of agglomeration economies on this development. Most studies in this genre attribute the concentration of FDI in China's coastal region to agglomeration economies (see e.g. Chen, 1997; Wei et al., 1999; Wei and Liu, 2001; Zhang, 2001; Sun et al., 2002). However, some researchers cast doubt over the generality of this result due to the aggregated, provincial-level data used in these studies (see e.g. Cheng, 2007, 2008). This aggregation of data can lead to loss of valuable information such as the impact of agglomeration economies on foreign investors from different industries.

In light of the above-mentioned criticism, there has been a nascent literature investigating the nexus of agglomeration economies and regional distribution of FDI in China using disaggregated data. Using firm-level data, Belderbos and Carree (2002) study Japanese electronics firms' location choice in China and find that agglomeration economies form an important input for *keiretsu* member firms and medium-sized firms. They attribute this finding to information spillovers associated with nationality agglomeration. Wakasugi (2005) extends Belderbos and Carree's study by examining Japanese investors' location choice in China at the industry level. He finds that Japanese investors' location choice is heavily influenced by industry-specific agglomeration economies. Unlike Belderbos and Carree, he finds that nationality agglomeration only has a marginal impact. For Korean investors, Chang and Park (2005) discover that the emergence of Korean clusters in the northeast of China can be attributed to both nationality agglomeration and chaebol membership. It is worth noting that because their study excludes wage rates, this can exaggerate the impact of agglomeration economies.

This positive agglomeration economies effect is not only confined at the firm level. Head and Ries (1996) find that there is also a positive agglomeration economies effect when they examine

the location of Japanese equity joint ventures at the city level. However, their finding cannot be generalised as they exclude FDI by ethnic Chinese, which accounts for roughly two-thirds of FDI stock in China. To date, with the exception of He (2003), who attributes the co-location of Hong Kong investors in China to the benefit of nationality agglomeration, there have been no systematic studies on the impact of agglomeration economies on ethnic Chinese investors' location choice in China. Therefore, our first motivation for undertaking this study is to fill this gap in the literature by studying Taiwanese greenfield investors' location choice in China.

Our second motivation for undertaking this study is to make a methodological contribution to the extant literature. Most empirical studies of foreign investors' location choice is based on conditional logit model (CLM) specifications (Guimaraes et al., 2003). However, for this model to provide meaningful results, it must be the case that all industrial locations are equally substitutable (McFadden, 1974). This assumption clearly contradicts the industrial location literature that postulates no two locations are ever the same; for example, the Silicon Valley would be a more attractive location choice for high-technology firms than Wall Street (see e.g. Saxenian, 1994; Woodward et al., 2006). In econometric terms, the presence of industrial clusters such as the Silicon Valley can lead to *'overdispersion, or a situation where the data exhibit variances larger than those permitted by the multinomial model'*, which casts doubts over the validity of the CLM estimates (Woodward et al., 2006, p.19). In order to control for this overdispersion effect, most studies use regional dummy variables, on the basis that locations within the same region share similar attributes (see e.g. Woodward, 1992; Coughlin and Segev, 2000; Cheng and Stough, 2006).

In another group of studies, the CLM model is either combined with Poisson distribution or Dirichlet-Multinomial distribution to correct for violations of the 'independence from irrelevant alternatives' (IIA) property, i.e. omitting any location alternative from the location choice set should not change the investor's decision (see e.g. Guimaraes et al., 2000; Woodward et al., 2006).

In this paper, we approach this overdispersion problem by applying the nested logit model (NLM) to Taiwanese greenfield investors' location choice in China. This approach is also used by Hansen (1987), Ondrich and Wasylenko (1993) and Cheng (2007) to investigate factors attracting greenfield FDI in Brazil, the United States and China. The starting premise of our

choice of the NLM is based on the stylised fact that firms often make location choices based on their prior knowledge of a location, rather than on a detailed evaluation of all possible location alternatives (see e.g. North, 1974; Rees, 1974; Qu and Green, 1997). To capture this limited search process, we assume that Taiwanese greenfield investors' location choice in China as essentially follows a 'sequential selection process' in which Taiwanese investors first select a region that is familiar to them, before identifying the best location for undertaking investment within that region.<sup>1</sup> By grouping closely substitutable location alternatives into one subset, we are able to minimise potential violations of the IIA property. Our study represents the first attempt to apply the NLM specification to Taiwanese greenfield investors' location choice in China.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section provides the model and presents the econometric methodology. In the third section we discuss the data set and potential agglomeration forces attracting Taiwanese greenfield investment. We discuss the empirical results in the fourth section. The final section summarises the main findings of the paper.

## 2 The Model

### 2.1 The Nested Logit Model

In studying firm location choices, CLM is the most commonly adopted approach. It was first developed by McFadden (1974) based on the random utility maximisation specification proposed by Marschak (1960). Consistent with the neoclassical theory of utility maximisation, it assumes that a decision-maker would choose an alternative if it yields the highest utility. As Carlton (1983) shows, firm location choices can be seen as a variant of Marschak's random utility maximisation problem. Specifically, if firms are assumed to be profit maximisers, then they will only establish plants in locations with the highest level of expected profit. Formally, firm  $i$  will establish a plant in location  $j$ , if and only if,

$$\pi_{ij} > \pi_{is} \forall j \neq s \quad (1)$$

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<sup>1</sup>It is important to note that even though the hierarchical decision structure suggests a sequential decision-making process, this does not imply that firms actually make location choices sequentially. It is simply a way to analyse the decision-making process by grouping potential location choices and take into account possible dependence among alternative locations (see e.g. Cheng, 2007).

The actual profit delivered by each location alternative to the firm is, however, not directly observable. This is because there are two components to this unknown profit function; namely, a 'deterministic' and a 'stochastic' component. Formally, this unknown profit function of firm  $i$  in location  $j$  can be expressed as:

$$\pi_{ij} = V_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij} = \beta_{ij}X_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij} \quad (2)$$

where  $X_{ij}$  are observable characteristics of a location alternative and  $\epsilon_{ij}$  is a stochastic factor capturing any profit differences resulting from all unobservable factors. The existence of the random component in equation (2) means that one cannot be absolutely certain about the exact location choices made by firms. However, McFadden (1974) suggests that one can infer the probability of a location being selected by a firm if  $\epsilon_{ij}$  are independently and identically distributed (IID) according to an extreme-type-value 1 Weibull distribution. Mathematically, the probability of firm  $i$  choosing location  $j$  can be expressed as:

$$Pr(Y_i = j) = \frac{\exp(X_{ij}\beta_i)}{\sum_{s=1}^j \exp(X_{is}\beta_i)} \quad (3)$$

The increasing popularity of CLM in the study of discrete choices can be attributed to its computational convenience because the IID stochastic component allows a closed-form probability solution as shown in equation (3). However, for equation (3) to hold, it requires  $\epsilon_{ij}$  to satisfy the IIA property, or the probability ratio of any two location alternatives depends only on their own attributes and is independent of other available location alternatives. This is because, in any good specification of CLM, the independent variables should capture all observable characteristics in which the stochastic component  $\epsilon_{ij}$  are not correlated (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). To put it differently, firms consider all location alternatives as equally substitutable and omitting any of them from the location choice set should not have any material impact on firms' location choice (Train, 2003).

Given the importance of the IIA property, Hausman and McFadden (1984) propose a diagnostic test by comparing estimated CLM coefficients of an 'unrestricted' model that is derived from the whole choice set and a 'restricted' model in which some alternative choices are excluded. The idea behind comparing results from these two models is that if a subset of the

choice set was truly irrelevant, then omitting it from the restricted model should not produce any statistically significant different results than those provided by the unrestricted model. In the industrial location literature, violations of the IIA property may not be problematic if possible location alternatives are geographically quite distant (Carlton, 1983). However, this may not apply to the case of China, where possible location alternatives are not equally substitutable due to geographic features and past economic policy (see e.g. Bao et al., 2002). For instance, *Beijing* and *Tianjin* or *Jiangsu* and *Zhejiang* might be a closer substitute than *Fujian* and *Xizang*.

As our earlier discussion suggests, the conventional approach for controlling potential violations of the IIA property is to use regional dummy variables, which capture similar unobservable location characteristics within a region. However, the major shortcoming associated with this approach is that it provides little information regarding firms' location choice, particularly with respect to our hypothesised sequential path of Taiwanese greenfield investors' location choice in China. By contrast, the NLM relaxes this IIA property by dividing the choice set into mutually exclusive subsets, with this property continuing to hold within, but not across, these subsets (Train, 2003). In other words, each subset in the NLM specification contains choices with similar location attributes. This choice model can then be described by a sequential selection process, where the firm first considers a choice between subsets (the upper nest) and then makes a choice for one of the location alternatives in the chosen subset (the lower nest).

In order to construct a specification of NLM that reflects this sequential selection process on Taiwanese greenfield investors' location choice in China, we need two separate specification of CLM. Formally, if we divide China into regions  $r = 1, 2, \dots, R$  and denote provinces  $p = 1, 2, \dots, P$ , each investor will choose the location alternative that maximises its profit stated in equation (2). In addition, the function of observed characteristics  $V_{rp}$  depends simultaneously on characteristics of the nest  $Y_r$  (the region) and on location attributes that vary across provinces  $X_{rp}$ . We obtain  $V_{rp} = \beta X_{rp} + \alpha Y_r$ , where  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  are vectors of the parameters to be estimated.

The probability of a Taiwanese greenfield investor choosing a region in China depends simultaneously on the investor's own characteristics and on the location attributes of province alternatives that composed the nest. We define an expected maximum profit associated with

the nest, called ‘inclusive value’ ( $I_r$ ):

$$I_r = \log \sum_{i=1}^{P_r} \exp(\beta X_{ir}) \quad (4)$$

Consequently, the probability of a Taiwanese greenfield investor  $i$  chooses a region  $r$  in China is:

$$Pr(Y_i = r) = \frac{\exp(\sigma I_r + \alpha Y_r)}{\sum_{j=1}^R \exp(\sigma I_j + \alpha Y_j)} \quad (5)$$

The probability that this investor  $i$  chooses a province  $p$  within region  $r$  in China can be expressed as  $Pr(p|Y_i = r) = Pr(r|Y_i = p) \times Pr(Y_i = r)$  where

$$Pr(p|Y_i = r) = \frac{\exp(\beta X_{rp})}{\sum_{i=1}^{C_p} (\beta X_{ri})} \quad (6)$$

That is to say:

$$Pr(p|Y_i = r) = \frac{\exp(\beta X_{ir}) \times \exp(\sigma I_r + \alpha Y_r)}{\sum_{j=1}^R \exp(\sigma I_j + \alpha Y_j) \times (I_r)} \quad (7)$$

where the coefficient attached to  $I_r$ , or  $\sigma$ , is a measure of the degree of independence between province alternatives within the same nest (or subset). In general,  $\sigma$  has a range between zero and one, with a smaller  $\sigma$  indicating that the province alternatives within the nest are close substitutes (Maddala, 1983). Mucchielli and Puech (2004) suggest that if  $\sigma$  equals zero, then all province alternatives within that nest would be completely dependent, turning the NLM specification into a standard CLM specification. Similarly, if  $\sigma$  equals one, then all province alternatives would be completely independent and the NLM specification becomes superfluous.

In short,  $\sigma$  serves as an indicator for a nested structure of Taiwanese greenfield investors’ location choice in China, with  $1 - \sigma$  measuring the degree of similarity between regions (see e.g. Cheng, 2007). To put it differently, this means that if  $\sigma$  were statistically significant and all fell within the range between zero and one, then we may conclude that these investors’ location choice follows a sequential selection process; that is, Taiwanese investors would first choose their desired region and then select a specific province within that region in which to invest (see e.g. Hensher and Johnson, 1981).

## 2.2 Estimation Procedure

In order to test whether Taiwanese greenfield investors' location choice in China follow a sequential selection process and the location attributes that give rise to such a process, we first estimate three separate specifications of CLM. Specifically, the first CLM specification that we estimate covers the sample period 1996-2005 and serves as our baseline model. The second and third CLM specifications divide this period into two sub-sample periods; namely, 1996-2000 and 2001-2005. The rationale for this split is to examine whether there is a structural break in Taiwanese investors' location choices following the change in the policy governing Taiwanese investment in China in 2000.

In terms of estimating these three CLM specifications, we employ the maximum likelihood method. Consistent with convention, we examine the likelihood ratio,  $\chi^2$ , with a higher value of this ratio suggesting joint significance of independent variables in the model. We also examine the overall goodness-of-fit of the model by referring to the likelihood ratio index,  $\rho^2$ . It is worth noting that although there does not yet exist a preferred level of  $\rho^2$ , the consensus in the existing literature is that if  $\rho^2$  takes a value within the range 0.2 and 0.4, then the model can be considered as having a reasonable level of goodness-of-fit (see e.g. Greene, 2000).

As our earlier discussion suggests, for CLM estimates to be robust, there must be no violations of the IIA property. To ascertain that this is the case, we test NLM specifications. The logic behind these specifications is that if Taiwanese greenfield investors' location choice in China follows a sequential process, then the inclusive value coefficients within these specifications should be statistically significant and fall within the range of zero and one. Following Cheng (2007), we divide China according to the Open Door policy and traditional census regions, which may have non-negligible effects on Taiwanese investors. Specifically, the first specification is based on the Open Door policy in which the Eastern region was first opened to FDI, followed by the Central and Western regions.<sup>2</sup> This gradualist approach is expected to have a non-negligible impact on Taiwanese investors' location choice. Hence, our objective is to test the hypothesis that Taiwanese investors would first choose their desired Open Door policy region and then select a specific province within that region.

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<sup>2</sup>The Eastern region includes *Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Guangxi* and *Hainan*. The Central region includes *Shanxi, Neimenggu, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei* and *Hunan*. The Western region includes *Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang* and *Xizang*.

The second specification is based on the six traditional census regions in China; namely, *Huabei*, *Dongbei*, *Huadong*, *Huazhong*, *Xinan* and *Xibei*.<sup>3</sup> Our objective in selecting this division is to test the hypothesis that Taiwanese investors first select their preferred census region before choosing a province within that region. Analysis of the impact of these census regions on Taiwanese investors' location choice is important because provinces within the same census region tend to share similar historical, cultural and ethnical ties. These characteristics imply that, if the Chinese policymakers want to attract further inflow of FDI, then they need to improve the investment environment of the entire census region, rather than focusing on individual provinces.

Apart from dividing our sample size according to regions, we also split the entire sample period into two sub-sample periods; namely, 1996-2000 and 2001-2005. This split is designed to assess the impact of policy changes in 2000 on Taiwanese investors' location choice.

It is well-documented in the industrial location literature that the impact of location attributes is industry-specific. In order to examine this hypothesis, we divide our sample firms according to industry, and perform our baseline CLM specification on these sub-samples. It is worth pointing out that because the dependent variable in this specification is the probability of a Chinese province being selected by a Taiwanese greenfield investor, the resulting estimated coefficients do not directly measure the marginal effect of location attributes on that investor's location choice. As such, we interpret the estimated coefficients by adopting the 'average probability elasticity', or the sum of probability elasticity across all individual investors and location alternatives (see e.g. Head et al., 1995; Wakasugi, 2005; Cheng, 2008). Formally, the average probability elasticity of a Taiwanese greenfield investor  $i$  choosing a Chinese province  $p$  with location attribute  $X_k$  can be calculated as follows:

$$E_{ip}^k = \frac{\partial Pr(Y_i = p)}{\partial X_k} \frac{X_k}{Pr(Y_i = p)} = \beta_k(1 - Pr(Y_i = p)) \quad (8)$$

This average probability elasticity of location attribute  $X_k$  then can be obtained by summing

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<sup>3</sup>The *Huabei* region includes *Beijing*, *Tianjin*, *Hebei*, *Shanxi* and *Inner Mongolia*. The *Huadong* region includes *Shandong*, *Jiangxi*, *Fujian*, *Anhui*, *Zhejiang*, *Jiangsu* and *Shanghai*. The *Huazhong* region includes *Hainan*, *Guangxi*, *Guangdong*, *Hunan*, *Hubei* and *Henan*. The *Xinan* region includes *Guizhou*, *Sichuan*, *Yunnan* and *Tibet*. The *Xibei* region includes *Shaanxi*, *Gansu*, *Qinghai*, *Ningxia* and *Xinjiang*.

all investors and provinces:

$$E^k = \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{p=1}^{24} E_{ip}^k = \beta_k \frac{P-1}{P} = \beta_k \frac{24-1}{24} = 0.96\beta_k \quad (9)$$

where  $P$  is the total number of provinces in China and  $\beta_k$  is the estimated coefficient of location attribute  $X_k$ , its estimated marginal effect, is equal to 96 percent of  $\beta_k$ .

### 3 Data and Variables

#### 3.1 Identification of Taiwanese Greenfield Investors

This paper examines the Taiwanese greenfield investors' location choice in China from 1996 to 2005. This selection of the unit of analysis is justified on the following grounds. First, unlike merger and acquisition in which the location of investment is often pre-determined, these investors are free to establish plants at any location in China. Second, given the substantial costs involved in establishing foreign production units, these investors are more responsive to fiscal incentives and preferential treatment at the regional level. We incorporate this by dividing China into two subsets according to the Open Door policy and census regions. Third, and perhaps more importantly, since plant relocation is costly, a better understanding of these investors' location choices sheds light on their global investment strategies and mixed performance in China.

We employ both CLM and NLM specifications to analyse Taiwanese greenfield investors' location choice in China. The information related to this investment is obtained from Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA). According to MOEA, during the period from 1996 to 2005, there was a total of 2,131 greenfield investments in China made by Taiwan's public listed companies. We investigated the greenfield investment undertaken by these companies, on the basis that they feature prominently in the economic exchanges between China and Taiwan. We also omit greenfield investments that are not explicitly registered with MOEA. Finally, we exclude those investors who re-invest in, or withdraw their involvement from, China. In other words, our study focuses exclusively on these investors' initial location choice, not on their operational success or failure in subsequent periods.

For any discrete choice model, it is necessary for each individual alternative in the choice

set to be chosen at least once (see e.g. Head et al., 1995; Belderbos and Carree, 2002). Table 1 shows that, during the period 1996–2005, *Xinjiang*, *Tibet*, *Gansu*, *Yunnan*, *Qinghai* and *Ningxia* received no Taiwanese greenfield investment at all. As a consequence, we exclude these six provinces from the choice set. In order to maintain consistency and constrained by data availability, we regard investment in *Chongqing* as part of greenfield investment in *Sichuan*. It is worth noting that, since provinces with no such investment are excluded from the sample, this can generate potential sample selection bias. Therefore, we interpret the dependent variable in our analysis as the probability of a province being chosen from the remaining 24 provinces by Taiwanese investors.

[Insert Table 1]

## 3.2 Identification of Agglomeration Forces

### 3.2.1 Market Access

Economic liberalisation has resulted in China opening up its domestic market to foreign investors. This change has encouraged many Taiwanese investors to establish production facilities in large Chinese provinces for two reasons. Firstly, it enhances the prospects of realising economies of scale in production and transportation of final goods. Secondly, it increases the likelihood of these investors reaching new customers. Therefore, all things being equal, the probability of a Chinese province being selected by Taiwanese greenfield investors increases with market access.

The most commonly used measurement of market access is the level of gross provincial product (GPP), on the basis that a higher level of GPP implies a higher purchasing power of residents in the province (see e.g. Belderbos and Carree, 2002; Zhou et al., 2002; Cheng and Stough, 2006; Kang and Lee, 2007). In contrast, some studies have suggested that population density may be a better indicator of market size as a higher population density suggests a higher market potential (see e.g. Zhou et al., 2002; Chang and Park, 2005). In our study, we will use both measures as the alternative proxy for market access and expect a positive sign.

### **3.2.2 Industrial Linkages**

The extent of industrial linkages affects the willingness of Taiwanese investors to invest in a province. This is because by locating in a province with a strong industrial base, it enhances the ability of Taiwanese investors to source raw and intermediate inputs from local suppliers and the likelihood of these investors to become intermediate input suppliers within that local industrial network. Furthermore, it allows Taiwanese investors better access to specialised input providers such as consultancy, banking and finance and other professional services. Therefore, all things being equal, the probability of a province being selected by Taiwanese greenfield investors increases with industrial linkages.

Three potential measures of local industrial linkages are widely investigated in the existing literature. The first measure is based on the argument that the likelihood of a firm becoming a supplier to other firms increases with the number of manufacturing firms in the province (see e.g. Head and Ries, 1996; Zhou et al., 2002; Chang and Park, 2005; Wakasugi, 2005). The second measure is based on the premise that provinces with a higher number of manufacturing workers indicate a better availability of specialised services (see e.g. Head and Ries, 1996; Chang and Park, 2005; Cheng, 2007). The third measure is based on the network effect, which suggests that foreign investors from the same country tend to co-locate in the same provinces as they simply extend industrial linkages established in the home countries to the host countries (see e.g. Head and Ries, 1996; Chang and Park, 2005; Wakasugi, 2005; Cheng and Stough, 2006; Cheng, 2007). We will investigate these potential measures for industrial linkages in this study and expect a positive sign.

### **3.2.3 Labour-market pooling**

Traditionally, the majority of Taiwanese investors in China have originated from export-oriented, labour-intensive industries. For these investors, securing low-cost workers is critical to their international competitiveness. In recent years, however, these investors belonging to the capital-intensive and high-tech industries have increased their presence in China. By locating in provinces with an ample supply of well-educated workers, these investors have a higher probability of finding specialised workers. Therefore, the probability of a province being selected by Taiwanese greenfield investors increases with the availability of low-cost, quality workers.

In measuring the impact of labour-market pooling, the average real wage rate is often used in the existing literature (see e.g. Belderbos and Carree, 2002; Zhou et al., 2002; Wakasugi, 2005; Cheng and Stough, 2006; Kang and Lee, 2007). However, the average real wage rate may not be a good indicator due to its high correlation with labour quality. This potential endogeneity has led some studies to suggest measures of labour quality, such as the proportion of people receiving secondary or higher education to total population (Cheng, 2007). Meanwhile, other studies attempt to circumvent the problems associated with average wage rates by using efficiency wage rates instead (see e.g. Head and Ries, 1996; Belderbos and Carree, 2002). Both measures for the effect of labour-market pooling will be examined in this study and we expect a negative sign.

#### **3.2.4 Trade Costs**

The level of trade costs is expected to feature prominently in the locational choices of Taiwanese investors in China. This is because the trade costs associated with shipping intermediate inputs in and out of production facilities, as well as distributing final goods to consumers, account for a significant proportion of the operational expenses facing Taiwanese investors. Reductions in trade costs, in effect, increase their profitability in China. Therefore, all things being equal, the probability of a province being selected by Taiwanese greenfield investors increases with a low level of trade costs.

In the existing literature, transportation density in a province is the most commonly used measurement (see e.g. Zhou et al., 2002; Chang and Park, 2005; Wakasugi, 2005; Cheng and Stough, 2006; Kang and Lee, 2007; Cheng, 2007). Given the importance of exports to the Chinese economy, some studies have used the number of seaports and airports as alternative measures of trade costs (see e.g. Head and Ries, 1996; Belderbos and Carree, 2002). We will focus on the effect of provincial transportation densities, such as highways, railways, and the combination of highways and railways, on Taiwanese greenfield investors' location choice in China. We expect a positive sign on these transportation densities.

#### **3.2.5 Monitoring Costs**

The extent of industrial linkages affects the willingness of Taiwanese investors to invest in a province. This is because by locating in a province with a strong industrial base, the ability

of Taiwanese investors to source raw and intermediate inputs from local suppliers is enhanced, as is the likelihood of becoming intermediate input suppliers within local industrial networks. Furthermore, it allows Taiwanese investors better access to specialised input providers such as consultancy, banking and finance and other professional services. Therefore, all things being equal, the probability of a province being selected by Taiwanese greenfield investors decreases with monitoring costs.

There are two commonly used measures for monitoring costs in the existing literature. The first is provincial telephone density, on the basis that the share of local residents who have access to telephone sets reduces monitoring costs (Head and Ries, 1996). And the second is based on the provincial output of postal and telecommunication industries and the number of employees in these industries (Wei and Liu, 2001). In general, higher provincial output of, and more local employees in, postal and telecommunication industries suggest a better communication infrastructure, which is necessary for reducing monitoring costs. We expect a positive sign on these two measures.

### 3.3 Data

Table 2 provides summary statistics of 18 commonly proposed proxies for the agglomeration forces identified in Section 3.2, with the data taken from various issues of *China Statistical Yearbook* and *Statistics on Approved Indirect Mainland Investment by Year and Area*. In constructing that table, we convert GPP, GPP per capita and provincial outputs of manufacturing and postal and telecommunication industries into 1990 prices using the gross domestic product (GDP) deflator for the relevant province. Similarly, the consumer price index for the relevant province is used to convert the provincial wage rates into 1990 prices. In order to obtain the respective densities, we adjust the population size, the total length of railways and highways and the number of telephone sets for landmass of the relevant province. In terms of the figures for cumulative FDI and Taiwanese investment in each province, we make 1996 our reference point and use the GDP deflator for the relevant province to deflate the stock of these investors since 1996. Finally, the numbers of foreign-invested and Taiwanese enterprises in the province are year-end figures.

[Insert Table 2]

The main problem in Table 2 is that these variables tend to overlap with one another, which gives rise to potential multicollinearity. In order to avoid spurious results, it is important to retain variables that are pertinent to the distribution of Taiwanese greenfield investment across China. To achieve that end, we calculate the Pearson correlation coefficient matrix by transforming these variables into their natural logarithm and stacking them across provinces. Gujarati (1995) suggests that, as a rule of thumb, multicollinearity poses a serious problem if the Pearson pair-wise correlation exceeds 0.6. A visual inspection examination of Table 3 reveals that there is a high degree of correlation among the proposed variables for agglomeration forces (as highlighted in bold).

[Insert Table 3]

In order to select the best proxies for the agglomeration forces affecting the annual inflow of Taiwanese investment across China, we perform factor analysis. As pointed out by Cramer (2003), factor analysis is the simplest and most widely used approach in data reduction.<sup>4</sup> However, before we perform factor analysis, it is useful to standardise the variables for two reasons. Firstly, standardisation controls for substantial inter-provincial differences in location attributes, such as population and landmass, by removing the unit of measurement from the variables. Secondly, the standardised variables can be expressed exactly as a linear combination of common factor scores of the principal components.

Factor analysis using Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation is conducted on the data matrix of the 18 variables listed in Table 1 from 1996 to 2005.<sup>5</sup> After seven iterations, we removed items that are highly loaded on more than one factor and ended up with the five factors shown in Table 4. In this solution, factor retention is based on scree plots and eigenvalues. These five factors account for approximately 90 percent of the variance in the 18 variables identified. Specifically, market access indicates the market potential in a province via GPP ( $Gpp$ ), GPP per capita ( $Pgpp$ ), and population density ( $Popd$ ). The length of railways ( $Rwayd$ ), highways ( $Hwayd$ ), and the combined length of railways and highways ( $Wayd$ ) adjusted for the landmass indicate transportation network coverage in a province, hence the label trade costs. Industrial

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<sup>4</sup>This is also the approach adopted by Zhou et al. (2002) in their study of Japanese investors' location choice in China.

<sup>5</sup>We also used Quartimax rotation with Kaiser Normalisation. After five iterations, we reached the same quantitative conclusion as those shown in Table 4.

linkages comprise manufacturing output (*Moutput*), the number of manufacturing firms (*NMF*), the number of manufacturing workers (*Mworker*), the cumulative stocks of FDI (*CFDI*) and Taiwanese investment (*CTDI*), and the number of registered projects affiliated with foreign capital (*NFDI*) and Taiwanese capital (*NTDI*). Average wage rate (*Awage*) and efficiency wage rate (*Ewage*) are variables measuring the impact of labour-market pooling. Telephone density (*Teld*) and the output of postal and telecommunication industries (*Toutput*), and number of postal and telecommunication employees (*Tworker*) are potential proxies for monitoring costs.

[Insert Table 4]

As Table 4 shows, *Popd* is the best proxy for market access. Trade costs are best captured by *Hwayd*. *Mworker* explains most of the variations in industrial linkages. We select *Ewage* and *Teld* to measure the impacts of labour-market pooling and monitoring costs, respectively. These results are consistent with the discussion in Section 3.2; namely, the probability of a Chinese province being selected by Taiwanese investors increases with *Popd*, *Hwayd*, *Mworker* and *Teld*, while it decreases with *Ewage*. In order to ensure that there is no multicollinearity between these variables, we reconstruct the Pearson pair-wise correlation coefficient matrix. As expected, Table 5 indicates that there is no significant degree of correlation among the five selected proxies for agglomeration forces.

[Insert Table 5]

## 4 Empirical Results

### 4.1 Conditional Logit Estimates

In this section, we discuss the CLM estimates of the response of Taiwanese investors in China to different types of agglomeration force for the full and sub-sample periods. The estimation results are presented in Table 6. For the full sample period 1996-2005 (Model 1), provincial population density (*Popd*), provincial number of manufacturing workers (*Mworker*) and provincial telephone density (*Teld*) have significantly positive effects on the probability of a province being selected by Taiwanese investors. In contrast, the level of provincial efficiency wage rate (*Ewage*) has a significantly negative effect. These results suggest that Taiwanese investors prefer

provinces with strong effects of market access, industrial linkages and labour-market pooling, while they avoid provinces with a strong effect of monitoring costs.

[Insert Table 6]

We also make year 2000 our reference point and use it to divide the full sample period into two sub-sample periods; namely, 1996-2000 and 2001-2005. Comparing the results of Models 2 and 3 in Table 6 show that the change in cross-Strait policy in 2000 have had a non-negligible impact on Taiwanese investors' location choice in China. For the period 1996-2000 (Model 2), the probability of a province being selected by Taiwanese investors increases with *Mworker* and it decreases with *Ewage*. In contrast, for the period 2001-2005 (Model 3), while *Mworker* is still an important agglomeration force attracting Taiwanese investors, the impacts of *Popd*, *Hwayd* and *Teld* have all increased in importance. These results suggest that, since 2000, the effects of market access, trade costs and monitoring costs have become important agglomeration forces.

The different results obtained for the two sub-sample period analyses suggest that there is a possible structural break in Taiwanese investors' location choice in China during the period 1996-2005. Potential sources of this structural break range from a series of economic reforms in China in the late 1990s in preparation for joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to major changes in cross-Strait policy after 2000. For instance, the increase in importance of *Popd* could be attributed to China allowing Taiwanese investors greater domestic market access after its accession to the WTO after 2000. In addition, the larger coefficient on *Mworker* during the period 2001-2005 could indicate a greater proportion of Taiwanese investors engaged in local procurement of raw and intermediate inputs, with the availability of these inputs depending on the extent of local industrial linkages. The statistical significance of the coefficient on *Teld* during the period 2001-2005 may arise from the emerging pattern of cross-Strait division of labour in which Taiwanese headquarters mainly undertake sales and R&D activities and their Chinese subsidiaries undertake most of the production activity. With these arguments, a sound telecommunication infrastructure is indispensable to the smooth running of cross-border operations, which in turn reduces monitoring costs.

Perhaps the most important result stemming from the sub-sample period analysis is that, during the period 2001-2005, the level of *Ewage* had no material effect on Taiwanese investors' location choice in China. One possible explanation for this result could be attributed to the

lifting of restrictions on the investment activities of high-tech and capital-intensive industries by the Taiwanese government after 2000. For these investors, it is labour quality, rather than the level of the wage rate, that ultimately determines their competitiveness, both at the local and international levels.

It is also worth noting that although both the likelihood ratio  $\chi^2$  and the likelihood ratio index  $\rho^2$  are satisfactory for all three models, Table 6 suggests that our CLM specification seems to explain Taiwanese greenfield investors' location choice in China better for the period 1996-2000. In part, these differences in the goodness-of-fit across models could be attributed to the changing nature of Taiwanese investors. For example, during 1996-2000, the majority of Taiwanese investors originated from traditional, labour-intensive industries which tended to be attracted by the same set of agglomeration forces. In contrast, since 2000, Taiwanese investors have originated from a wide array of industries, with each industry sharing a distinctively different ideal set of agglomeration forces. In other words, the widening and deepening of Taiwanese investment in China in recent years may be the main reason for the diminishing explanatory power of the CLM specification.

## 4.2 Nested Logit Estimates

One of the main criticisms of the CLM specification is that its estimated coefficients and robustness are sensitive to violations of the IIA property. In order to ensure that our CLM estimates are free from any such violation, we apply NLM specifications to the sample. The basic idea here is that if CLM is truly independent of any violation of the IIA property, then inclusive value (IV) coefficients should be statistically insignificant and fall outside the range of zero and one.<sup>6</sup> Consistent with Section 4.1, we present the NLM estimates for the entire sample, as well as for the two sub-sample periods. In addition, we divide China according to the three Open Door policy regions (3R) and the six traditional census regions (6R) as a means of capturing the sequential selection process of Taiwanese greenfield investors' location choice in China.

[Insert Table 7]

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<sup>6</sup>We also perform the Hausman-McFadden test and a visual inspection of the results suggests that all three CLM specifications violate the IIA assumption, i.e., the p-values of omitted alternatives in CLM specifications are extremely low.

Table 7 presents the results using the NLM specifications. We find that inclusive value coefficients in all three NLM specifications for 3R (Models 1-3) are both statistically significant and fall within the range between zero and one. This finding suggests that the Taiwanese investors' location choice in China does, indeed, follow a sequential selection process, or these investors first choose an Open Door policy region and then select a specific province within that region. In contrast, we find that traditional census regions have no impact on Taiwanese investors, as evidence in the associated IV coefficients in all three NLM specifications for 6R (Models 4-6) are not statistically significant and fall outside the range between zero and one. Finally, recall that IV coefficients indicate the degree of choice substitutability, and that these coefficients for all three NLM (3R) specifications belong to the unit interval  $(0, 1)$ . This suggests that nested provinces within each Open Door policy region are relevant, with the coefficient  $1 - \sigma$  providing the degree of similarity across province alternatives. From Table 7, we can see that any pair of provinces belonging to the same Open Door policy region is quite different, as the value of IV coefficients ranges between 0.63 and 0.69.

Furthermore, nesting provinces within Open Door policy regions seems to be a good specification for Taiwanese greenfield investors' location choice in China according to the likelihood ratio  $\chi^2$  and likelihood ratio index  $\rho^2$  for Models 1-3 in Table 7. It is also worth noting that all significant variables are consistent with a priori expectations. These results are also qualitatively the same as those obtained under CLM specifications in Section 4.1. That is to say, the probability of a province being selected by these investors increases with the effects of market access, industrial linkages and labour-market pooling, while it decreases with the effect of monitoring costs.

In summary, in our NLM estimations, the significance of IV coefficients demonstrates that independently modelling Taiwanese greenfield investors' location choice in China, such as using CLM specifications, constitutes an inappropriate approach. Instead the correct econometric method should be the NLM specifications, with the Open Door policy regions composing the upper nest.

### 4.3 Location Choice at the Industry Level

Locational determinants are expected to vary according to the nature of the industry. As such, we divide the sample according to industry group; namely, Chemicals, Electrics and Electronics, Food Processing, Machinery, Metals, Transportation, Textiles and Retails and Services. We then re-apply the NLM specification for three Open Door policy regions (Model 1 in Table 7) to each industry group.

Table 8 shows that estimated results vary extensively across these eight industries. Specifically, the effect of provincial population density (*Popd*) is not common across industries, as it only positively affects Taiwanese investors in Electrics and Electronics, Food Processing and Retails and Services. This finding is consistent with the view that many investors in these industries are attracted to China's mass market (see e.g. Belderbos and Carree, 2002; Zhu, 2005; Cheng, 2007). In addition, we find that provincial highway density (*Hwayd*) positively affects Taiwanese investors in Chemicals, Electrics and Electronics, Food Processing, Metals and Textile. This finding is to be expected as an extensive transportation network facilitates 'Just-in-Time' supply chain management in these industries (see e.g. Tung, 2004; Zhu, 2005). Provincial telephone Density (*Teld*) positively affects Taiwanese investors in Chemicals, Electrics and Electronics, Textiles and Retails and Services. This finding is consistent with the view that a high level of monitoring costs can be a deterrent for FDI (see e.g. Robert-Nicoud, 2002; Lin and Png, 2003). Both the provincial number of manufacturing workers (*Mworker*) and provincial efficiency wage rate (*Ewage*) affects Taiwanese investors across all industries. These findings reflect the fact that worsening production conditions in Taiwan forced many of these investors to move their production facilities to China (see e.g. Chu, 1993; Chen Chiu, 1995; Cheng, 2001). Finally, fiscal incentives and preferential treatment given to foreign investors in the Eastern region under the Open Door policy has a positive effect on Taiwanese investors in Chemicals, Electrics and Electronics, Food Processing, Textiles and Retails and Services.

[Insert Table 8]

In summary, Table 8 suggests that industrial linkages and labour-market pooling, coupled with the Open Door policy, explains a large proportion of the uneven distribution of Taiwanese greenfield investment in China. Furthermore, we find that these investors in Chemicals, Electrics

and Electronics, Food Processing, Textiles and Retails and Services follow a sequential selection process when making location decisions.

It is worth noting that estimated coefficients of almost all the variables for industries such as Machinery, Metal and Transportation are statistically insignificant. Specifically, the Log-Likelihood ratio  $\rho^2$  of these industries fall outside of the range of 0.2 and 0.4, indicating that our model specification may not be an appropriate choice for analysing Taiwanese investors' location choice in China. To state it differently, these investors may face industry-specific factors that differ from those in other industries, perhaps in terms of input production technology.

We conclude this section by presenting the average elasticity of probability for the eight industries. Table 9 shows that a 1% increases in *Popd*, it raises the probability of a province being chosen by Taiwanese investors in China by 3.86%. Similarly, a 1% increases in *Mworker* increases the probability of a province being chosen by Taiwanese investors by 3.67%. Finally, a 1% increases in *Ewage* decrease the probability of a province being chosen by Taiwanese investors by 3.26%. These results suggest that the effects of market access, industrial linkages and labour-market pooling may explain a large extent of the distribution of Taiwanese greenfield investment in China.

[Insert Table 9]

A closer inspection of Table 9 indicates that the impact of market access is found to affect Taiwanese investors in Food Processing and Retail and Services more than other industries. The impact of labour-market pooling is found to affect Taiwanese investors in Chemicals, Electrics and Electronics, Machinery and Textiles more than other industries. For Taiwanese investors in Electrics and Electronics and Machinery, the extent of industrial linkages is considered an important location attribute. Finally, the Open Door policy has a significant positive impact on Chemicals, Electrics and Electronics, Textiles and Retails and Services.

## 5 Conclusion

The aim of this paper was to explore the nature of agglomeration forces attracting Taiwanese investors in China during the period 1996-2005. In particular, we test the hypothesis that Taiwanese investors' location choice follows a sequential decision process. Specifically, after

applying the NLM specification to firm-level data, we find that Taiwanese investors first select the desired Open Door policy region, before selecting a province within that region. Given the fact that the Eastern region has a better investment environment as a result of its long history in hosting FDI, this finding suggests that if the objective of Chinese policymakers is to attract FDI into the Central and Western regions, they would need to improve the general investment environment in these areas, not just focusing on the investment environment of individual provinces.

Secondly, we find that there is a structural break in Taiwanese investors' location choice in China. Specifically, we find that the impact of labour-market pooling, as measured by provincial efficiency wage rate, has diminished since 2000. In contrast, the impacts of market access, industrial linkages and monitoring costs all have grown in importance since 2000. These findings suggest that while low labour cost remains one of the main sources attracting these investors, Chinese policymakers must design policies that open up domestic market to foreign investors, strengthen local industrial bases and improve telecommunication infrastructure if they are going to attract further Taiwanese investment.

Last, but not least, we find that although agglomeration forces such as market access, industrial linkages and labour-market pooling affect Taiwanese investors' location choice in China, their impact varies extensively across industries. This result suggests that there may be a role for industry-specific FDI policy.

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# Appendices

Table 1: Location of Taiwanese greenfield investment in China, 1996-2005, by province and industry

Industry Province	Chemicals	Electric	Food	Machinery	Metal	Transportation	Textiles	Retails	Total
Beijing	5	34	8	6	6	4	8	13	84
Tianjin	12	21	9	1	2	2	2	6	55
Hebei	1	1	0	0	4	0	1	0	7
Shanxi	1	3	0	0	1	0	0	0	5
Inner Mongolia	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Liaoning	2	7	4	0	0	1	1	2	17
Jilin	1	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	5
Heilongjiang	0	1	0	0	0	3	0	0	4
Shanghai	50	212	17	26	37	18	26	62	448
Jiangsu	7	14	0	2	5	2	1	2	33
Zhejiang	96	351	11	15	68	26	38	21	626
Anhui	2	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	6
Fujian	11	21	5	1	4	26	7	7	82
Jiangxi	0	4	1	0	0	1	2	0	8
Shandong	7	16	1	1	0	2	3	2	32
Henan	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	5
Hubei	3	12	1	0	0	3	1	2	22
Hunan	3	2	0	0	1	1	1	4	12
Guangdong	81	348	7	20	48	19	47	32	622
Guangxi	0	4	1	0	0	0	0	1	6
Hainan	0	1	0	0	2	1	0	0	4
Sichuan	3	9	0	3	2	6	1	12	36
Guizhou	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Shaanxi	2	3	0	0	2	0	0	3	10
<b>Total</b>	<b>289</b>	<b>1,071</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>182</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>170</b>	<b>2,131</b>

Table 2: Summary statistics, by variable

Effect	Variable	Symbol	Sign	Mean	S.D.	Min.	Max.
Market access	Gross provincial product (RMB billion)	<i>Gpp</i>	+	4.404	2.920	0.588	6.159
	Gross provincial product per capita (RMB)	<i>Pgpp</i>	+	3.665	3.044	0.271	4.440
	Population density (person/km <sup>2</sup> )	<i>Popd</i>	+	1.455	0.259	0.402	2.554
Trade cost	Railway density (km/km <sup>2</sup> )	<i>Rwayd</i>	+	-1.867	-2.409	-1.161	0.301
	Highway density (km/km <sup>2</sup> )	<i>Hwayd</i>	+	4.644	3.589	0.337	5.224
	Total railways and highways density (km/km <sup>2</sup> )	<i>Wayd</i>	+	-0.457	-1.367	0.121	0.263
Industrial linkages	Manufacturing output (RMB billion)	<i>Moutput</i>	+	4.404	2.920	0.588	6.159
	Number of manufacturing workers (10,000 people)	<i>Mworker</i>	+	6.078	4.829	0.357	6.893
	Number of manufacturing firms (count)	<i>NMF</i>	+	3.661	4.605	0.435	2.790
	Cumulative FDI (RMB 10,000)	<i>CFDI</i>	+	9.762	8.802	0.498	10.909
	Number of foreign enterprises (count)	<i>NFDI</i>	+	3.694	2.775	0.481	4.782
	Cumulative Taiwanese investment (RMB10,000)	<i>CTDI</i>	+	5.512	3.320	0.818	7.510
	Number of Taiwanese enterprises (count)	<i>NTDI</i>	+	3.694	2.775	0.481	4.782
	Average real wage rate (RMB)	<i>Awage</i>	-	3.674	3.281	0.174	4.159
Labour-market pooling	Efficiency wage rate (RMB)	<i>Ewage</i>	-	2.649	2.206	0.207	3.220
	Telephone density (Telephone set per 1,000 people)	<i>Teld</i>	+	0.990	-0.042	0.406	1.772
	Postal and telecommunication output (RMB billion)	<i>Toutput</i>	+	3.255	1.848	0.600	4.963
Monitoring cost	Number of telecommunication and postal workers (10,000 people)	<i>Tworker</i>	+	5.348	4.542	0.236	5.750

Note: These descriptive statistics are based on the logged value and since log 0 is undefined, 10-4 is used to replace the zero whenever it occurs in the dataset. The panel data comprises observations of 29 provinces across the period 1996-2005.

Table 3: Pearson pair-wise correlation coefficient matrix, by variable

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. <i>Prgp</i>	1.00																	
2. <i>Popd</i>	0.59	1.00																
3. <i>Grp</i>	<b>0.83</b>	<b>0.90</b>	1.00															
4. <i>Hwayd</i>	-0.45	-0.52	-0.54	1.00														
5. <i>Lwayd</i>	0.62	<b>0.86</b>	<b>0.85</b>	-0.38	1.00													
6. <i>Rway</i>	0.59	0.65	0.69	-0.60	0.59	1.00												
7. <i>Mworker</i>	0.18	0.31	0.31	0.21	0.08	0.17	1.00											
8. <i>Indout</i>	<b>0.83</b>	<b>0.93</b>	<b>1.00</b>	-0.54	<b>0.85</b>	0.69	0.31	1.00										
9. <i>Teld</i>	<b>0.86</b>	0.39	0.65	-0.26	0.56	0.50	0.01	0.65	1.00									
10. <i>Telout</i>	<b>0.85</b>	<b>0.89</b>	<b>0.98</b>	-0.55	<b>0.85</b>	0.69	0.26	<b>0.98</b>	0.69	1.00								
11. <i>Tworker</i>	0.12	0.16	0.18	0.28	-0.08	0.11	<b>0.84</b>	0.18	-0.07	0.12	1.00							
12. <i>CNFDI</i>	0.67	0.63	<b>0.72</b>	-0.24	0.58	0.25	0.47	<b>0.72</b>	0.43	<b>0.72</b>	0.35	1.00						
13. <i>CNTDI</i>	0.39	0.05	0.21	0.21	0.26	0.15	-0.19	0.21	0.68	0.24	-0.22	-0.06	1.00					
14. <i>CFDI</i>	<b>0.76</b>	0.66	<b>0.78</b>	-0.22	0.64	0.31	0.44	<b>0.78</b>	0.56	<b>0.79</b>	0.34	<b>0.97</b>	0.09	1.00				
15. <i>CTDI</i>	<b>0.77</b>	0.60	<b>0.75</b>	-0.15	0.65	0.26	0.26	<b>0.75</b>	<b>0.73</b>	<b>0.76</b>	0.12	<b>0.78</b>	0.47	<b>0.84</b>	1.00			
16. <i>Ewage</i>	-0.01	0.08	0.04	-0.42	0.11	0.22	0.11	0.04	-0.06	0.06	-0.16	0.03	-0.31	-0.02	-0.07	1.00		
17. <i>Awage</i>	<b>0.77</b>	0.41	0.62	-0.19	0.59	0.37	-0.10	0.62	<b>0.86</b>	0.63	-0.17	0.35	<b>0.74</b>	0.49	<b>0.73</b>	-0.05	1.00	
18. <i>LNMF</i>	0.43	0.47	0.52	0.04	0.36	0.28	0.49	0.52	0.39	0.50	0.37	0.47	0.25	0.51	0.53	-0.21	0.34	1.00

Table 4: Principal components analysis

Variable	Market access	Trade costs	Industrial linkage	Labour-market pooling	Monitoring costs
<i>Gpp</i>	<b>0.841</b>	0.335	0.380	0.148	0.048
<i>Pgpp</i>	<b>0.461</b>	0.194	0.805	-0.019	0.046
<i>Popd</i>	<b>0.885</b>	0.331	0.118	0.205	0.030
<i>Rwayd</i>	0.848	<b>0.125</b>	0.135	0.105	-0.079
<i>Hwayd</i>	-0.560	<b>0.477</b>	-0.101	0.480	0.291
<i>Wayd</i>	0.817	<b>0.189</b>	0.241	0.365	0.013
<i>Moutput</i>	0.841	0.335	<b>0.380</b>	0.148	0.048
<i>Mworker</i>	0.284	0.908	<b>0.391</b>	0.151	-0.105
<i>NMF</i>	0.344	0.677	<b>0.272</b>	0.117	0.217
<i>CFDI</i>	0.583	0.550	<b>-0.077</b>	0.258	0.062
<i>NFDI</i>	0.594	0.578	<b>0.277</b>	0.239	0.014
<i>CTDI</i>	0.529	0.353	<b>0.200</b>	0.699	0.114
<i>NTDI</i>	0.444	0.258	<b>0.071</b>	0.808	0.152
<i>Awage</i>	0.159	-0.086	0.927	<b>-0.140</b>	0.047
<i>Ewage</i>	0.012	-0.078	-0.064	<b>-0.102</b>	-0.979
<i>Teld</i>	0.230	-0.001	0.924	0.057	<b>0.099</b>
<i>Toutput</i>	0.835	0.307	0.407	0.158	<b>0.010</b>
<i>Tworker</i>	0.210	0.889	-0.102	0.182	<b>0.030</b>
Eigenvalue	6.297	3.659	3.285	1.854	1.168
Cumulative variance	34.986	55.314	73.566	83.865	90.355

Note: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation. Rotation converged in seven iterations.

Table 5: Pearson pair-wise correlation coefficients, by selected variable

	<i>Popd</i>	<i>Hwayd</i>	<i>Mworker</i>	<i>Ewage</i>	<i>Teld</i>
<i>Popd</i>	1.00				
<i>Hwayd</i>	-0.52	1.00			
<i>Mworker</i>	0.31	0.21	1.00		
<i>Ewage</i>	0.08	-0.42	0.11	1.00	
<i>Teld</i>	0.39	-0.26	0.01	-0.06	1.00

Table 6: Conditional logit estimates, by selected period

	Model 1 1996-2005	Model 2 1996-2000	Model 3 2001-2005
<i>Popd</i>	0.933*** (2.495)	0.307 (1.321)	1.321*** (2.023)
<i>Hwayd</i>	0.119 (1.199)	-0.385 (0.271)	0.987* (1.542)
<i>Mworker</i>	0.367*** (2.891)	1.791*** (2.010)	2.110*** (2.592)
<i>Ewage</i>	-1.203*** (3.741)	-1.511*** (4.392)	-0.876 (0.762)
<i>Teld</i>	0.839*** (2.339)	-0.134 (0.021)	0.581*** (2.318)
Log-Likelihood	-1834.9	-2200.1	-1738.4
$\chi^2$	1649.96	2065.38	1593
$\rho^2$	0.331	0.294	0.221
Number of choosers	2,132	1,389	743
Number of choices	24	24	24

Note: Conditional logit regressions are estimated by maximum likelihood. Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\* and \* indicates 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance, respectively. The Log-Likelihood ratio  $\chi^2$  is computed as  $2(L_{UR} - L_R)$ , where  $L_{UR}$  is the Log-Likelihood value for the unrestricted model and  $L_R$  is the Log-Likelihood value for the restricted model. The Log-Likelihood ratio index  $\rho^2$  is computed as  $1 - \frac{L_{UR}}{L_0}$ , where  $L_0$  is the Log-Likelihood value of the model with only an intercept.

Table 7: Nested logit estimates, by regions

	Model 1 (3R) 1996-2005	Model 2 (3R) 1996-2000	Model 3 (3R) 2000-2005	Model 4 (6R) 1996-2005	Model 5 (6R) 1996-2001	Model 6 (6R) 2000-2005
<i>Popd</i>	4.019*** (4.323)	3.019** (2.321)	5.019*** (4.320)	2.019* (2.031)	4.019*** (3.981)	3.119*** (2.311)
<i>Hwayd</i>	0.024 (1.291)	0.123 (1.290)	1.224** (1.991)	0.624 (1.290)	1.093 (1.021)	0.519 (0.129)
<i>Mworker</i>	3.821*** (3.516)	2.821*** (2.519)	3.211* (1.817)	0.921*** (5.510)	0.182 (0.511)	0.121 (1.221)
<i>Ewage</i>	-3.392*** (4.323)	-3.003*** (3.320)	-1.262*** (2.320)	-4.645*** (4.100)	-3.392* (1.720)	-4.912*** (4.181)
<i>Teld</i>	0.017 (0.829)	0.347 (0.018)	1.117*** (2.820)	0.417 (1.082)	0.117 (0.520)	0.110* (1.812)
IV	0.631*** (2.871)	0.659*** (2.616)	0.697*** (2.283)	1.413 (1.081)	1.542 (0.998)	1.465 (1.130)
Log-Likelihood	-4044.1	-3992	-4032.4	-2039.1	-1831.2	-1632.2
$\chi^2$	3984.2	3900.7	3857.2	1988.7	1732.3	1536.9
$\rho^2$	0.312	0.309	0.311	0.148	0.210	0.111
number of choosers	2,132	743	1,389	1,389	2132	743
number of choices	24	24	24	24	24	24

Note: Nested logit regressions are estimated by maximum likelihood. Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\* and \* indicates 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance, respectively. 3R include the three regions under China's Open Door policy; namely, the Eastern, Middle and Western regions. 6R include the six traditional census regions in China; namely, the *Hubei*, *Dongbei*, *Huadong*, *Huazhong*, *Xinan* and *Xibei* regions.

Table 8: Nested logit estimates (based on Model 1 in Table 7, by selected industry

	Chemicals	Electrics	Food	Machinery	Metals	Transportation	Textiles	Retail
<i>Popd</i>	2.019 (0.323)	2.019*** (3.111)	4.442*** (2.325)	1.019 (0.998)	1.991 (1.213)	0.294 (0.323)	1.231* (1.777)	4.019*** (3.323)
<i>Hwagd</i>	1.024* (1.821)	1.400* (1.771)	1.344*** (2.963)	-0.021 (-0.291)	1.114** (2.118)	0.214 (0.991)	0.821** (2.001)	0.024 (1.291)
<i>Mworker</i>	0.821*** (2.526)	3.889*** (2.618)	1.199* (1.836)	2.109** (1.916)	0.991*** (2.516)	0.109*** (2.327)	1.229*** (2.516)	0.821*** (2.516)
<i>Ewage</i>	-2.392** (-2.001)	-3.652*** (-4.323)	-1.320* (-1.891)	-2.494*** (-3.121)	-3.222* (-1.811)	-3.392* (-1.833)	-3.432*** (-2.323)	-1.392* (-1.800)
<i>Teld</i>	1.017* (1.821)	1.576*** (2.897)	0.032 (0.294)	-0.017 (-0.653)	0.342 (0.452)	-0.281 (-0.529)	0.021** (1.983)	1.288*** (2.429)
IV coefficient								
<i>Eastern</i>	0.447** (2.140)	0.547*** (3.141)	0.381*** (2.904)	0.192 (0.885)	0.271 (0.801)	0.247 (0.928)	0.483*** (4.104)	0.247*** (2.910)
<i>Central</i>	0.205 (0.724)	0.202 (0.719)	0.211 (0.721)	0.201 (0.694)	0.205 (0.511)	0.203 (0.322)	0.212 (0.129)	0.241 (0.528)
<i>Western</i>	0.111 (0.917)	0.109 (0.811)	0.112 (0.919)	0.113 (0.703)	0.108 (0.823)	0.111 (1.032)	0.130 (0.921)	0.141 (0.421)
Log-Likelihood	-3844.12	-4115.6	-4003.8	-2204.3	-2390	-2198.1	-4044.3	-3898.4
$\chi^2$	3685.1	3841.4	3756.3	2099.5	2123.5	2000.6	3751.3	3697.6
$\rho^2$	0.331	0.353	0.348	0.216	0.227	0.213	0.341	0.338
number of choosers	289	1,071	66	76	182	118	140	170
number of choices	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24

Note: Nested logit regressions are estimated by maximum likelihood. Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\* and \* indicates 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance, respectively. 3R include the three regions under China's Open Door policy; namely, the Eastern, Central and Western regions.

Table 9: Elasticity of the probability of location choice, by industry

	Total	Chemicals	Electrics	Food	Machinery	Metals	Transportation	Textiles	Retails
<i>Popd</i>	3.858		1.938	4.264					3.858
<i>Hwayd</i>				1.290		1.069		0.788	
<i>Mworker</i>	3.668	0.788	3.733		2.205	0.951	0.105	1.180	0.788
<i>Ewage</i>	-3.256	-2.296	-3.506		-2.394			-3.295	
<i>Teld</i>			1.513						1.237
<i>Easterm</i>	0.429	0.525	0.366					0.464	0.237

Note: Based on estimated results in Table 8. Only figures with a statistical significance of over 5% are presented.